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@preamble{ " \newcommand{\noop}[1]{} " } % a do-nothing command that serves a purpose

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}

@inproceedings{von2012best,
  title={The best we can (expect to) get? Challenges to the classic semantics for deontic modals},
  author={von Fintel, Kai},
  booktitle={Central meeting of the American Philosophical Association, February},
  volume={17},
  year={2012}
}

@article{Kripke1963-KRISCO,
	pages = {83--94},
	journal = {Acta Philosophica Fennica},
	volume = {16},
	author = {Saul A. Kripke},
	year = {1963},
	number = {1963},
	title = {Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic}
}

@article{vonWright1953-VONAEI-4,
	author = {George H. von Wright},
	volume = {3},
	title = {An Essay in Modal Logic},
	number = {12},
	year = {1953},
	pages = {287--287},
	journal = {Philosophical Quarterly},
	publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}
}

@article{Kratzer1977-KRAWMA,
	publisher = {Springer},
	volume = {1},
	year = {1977},
	title = {What 'Must' and 'Can' Must and Can Mean},
	pages = {337--355},
	journal = {Linguistics and Philosophy},
	author = {Angelika Kratzer},
	number = {3}
}


@incollection{kratzer1981notional,
	title = {The notional category of modality},
	editor = {H.J. Eikmeyer and H. Reiser},
    author={Kratzer, Angelika},
    pages={38--74},
	publisher = {de Gruyter},
	booktitle = {Words, worlds, and contexts},
	year = {1981}
}

@article{lewis1981ordering,
  title={Ordering semantics and premise semantics for counterfactuals},
  author={Lewis, David},
  journal={Journal of philosophical logic},
  volume={10},
  number={2},
  pages={217--234},
  year={1981},
  publisher={Springer}
}

@incollection{Sripada2006-STIAFF,
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	editor = {Peter Carruthers and Stephen Laurence and Stephen P. Stich},
	title = {A Framework for the Psychology of Norms},
	year = {2006},
	author = {Chandra Sripada and Stephen Stich},
	booktitle = {The Innate Mind, Volume 2: Culture and Cognition}
}

@article{Cushman2008-CUSCAP,
	journal = {Cognition},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {353--380},
	number = {2},
	author = {Fiery Cushman},
	title = {Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment},
	volume = {108}
}

@book{Halpern2003-HALRAU,
	year = {2003},
	title = {Reasoning About Uncertainty},
	publisher = {MIT Press},
	author = {Joseph Y. Halpern}
}

@article{mccloskey1983intuitive,
  title={Intuitive physics: The straight-down belief and its origin.},
  author={McCloskey, Michael and Washburn, Allyson and Felch, Linda},
  journal={Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition},
  volume={9},
  number={4},
  pages={636},
  year={1983},
  publisher={American Psychological Association}
}

@article{gopnik2004theory,
  title={A theory of causal learning in children: causal maps and Bayes nets.},
  author={Gopnik, Alison and Glymour, Clark and Sobel, David M and Schulz, Laura E and Kushnir, Tamar and Danks, David},
  journal={Psychological review},
  volume={111},
  number={1},
  pages={3},
  year={2004},
  publisher={American Psychological Association}
}

@article{halpern2005causes,
  title={Causes and expanations: A structural-model approach. Part I: Causes},
  author={Halpern, Joseph Y and Pearl, Judea},
  journal={The British journal for the philosophy of science},
  volume={56},
  number={4},
  pages={843--887},
  year={2005},
  publisher={Br Soc Philosophy Sci}
}

@inproceedings{Phillips2016,
address = {Austin, TX},
author = {Phillips, Jonathan and Cushman, Fiery A},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 38th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society},
pages = {3007},
title = {{Multiple Systems for Modal Cognition}},
url = {https://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2016/papers/0653/index.html},
year = {2016}
}

@book{Descartes1984,
author = {Descartes, Ren{\'{e}}},
booktitle = {The Philosophical Writings of Descartes},
doi = {10.1016/0191-6599(88)90158-1},
editor = {Cottingham, John and Stoothoff, Robert and Murdoch, Dugald},
isbn = {0-415-07706-0},
issn = {1542-3050},
mendeley-groups = {Modality},
pmid = {21404738},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
title = {{The philosophical writings of Descartes}},
volume = {II},
year = {[1641]1984}
}

@book{Hume2007,
author = {Hume, David},
isbn = {1770482873},
mendeley-groups = {Modality},
publisher = {Broadview Press},
title = {{An enquiry concerning human understanding}},
year = {[1748]2007}
}

@book{Locke1975,
author = {Locke, John},
doi = {10.2307/2175691},
editor = {Nidditch, P.H.},
isbn = {0198245955},
mendeley-groups = {Modality},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
title = {{An essay concerning human understanding}},
volume = {3},
year = {[1690]1975}
}

@article{Chakroff2015,
abstract = {People make inferences about the actions of others, assessing whether an act is best explained by person-based versus situation-based accounts. Here we examine people's explanations for norm violations in different domains: harmful acts (e.g., assault) and impure acts (e.g., incest). Across four studies, we find evidence for an attribution asymmetry: people endorse more person-based attributions for impure versus harmful acts. This attribution asymmetry is partly explained by the abnormality of impure versus harmful acts, but not by differences in the moral wrongness or the statistical frequency of these acts. Finally, this asymmetry persists even when the situational factors that lead an agent to act impurely are stipulated. These results suggest that, relative to harmful acts, impure acts are linked to person-based attributions.},
author = {Chakroff, Alek and Young, Liane},
doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2014.11.034},
issn = {00100277},
journal = {Cognition},
keywords = {Action explanation,Attribution theory,Moral foundation theory,Moral psychology,Morality,Social cognition},
mendeley-groups = {Modality},
month = {mar},
pages = {30--37},
title = {{Harmful situations, impure people: An attribution asymmetry across moral domains}},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027714002546},
volume = {136},
year = {2015}
}

@article{Kelley1973,
abstract = {Presents a summary and synthesis of the author's work on attribution theory concerning the mechanisms involved in the process of causal explanations. The attribution theory is related to studies of social perception, self-perception, and psychological epistemology. Two systematic statements of attribution theory are described, discussed, and illustrated with empirical data: the covariation and the configuration concepts. Some problems for attribution theory are considered, including the interplay between preconceptions and new information, simple vs. complex schemata, attribution of covariation among causes, and illusions in attributions. The role of attribution in decision making and behavior is discussed. (56 ref.)},
author = {Kelley, H. H.},
journal = {American Psychologist},
publisher = {American Psychological Association},
doi = {10.1037/h0034225},
isbn = {0003-066X},
issn = {0003-066X},
pages = {107--128},
pmid = {8235594},
title = {{The processes of causal attribution.}},
volume = {28},
year = {1973}
}

@article{Frieze1971,
author = {Frieze, Irene and Weiner, Bernard},
doi = {10.1111/j.1467-6494.1971.tb00065.x},
issn = {0022-3506},
journal = {Journal of Personality},
mendeley-groups = {Modality},
month = {dec},
number = {4},
pages = {591--605},
title = {{Cue utilization and attributional judgments for success and failure}},
volume = {39},
year = {1971}
}


@misc{McArthur1972,
abstract = {Investigated H. Kelley's (see record 1968-13540-001) attribution theory. 87 male undergraduates filled out a questionnaire that reported 16 different responses ostensibly made by other people. These responses represented 4 verb categories emotions, accomplishments, opinions, and actions and, for the 64 experimental Ss, each was accompanied by high or low consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information. Control Ss were not given any information regarding the response. All Ss were asked to attribute each response to characteristics of the person (i.e., the actor), the stimulus, the circumstances, or to some combination of these 3 factors. In addition Ss' expectancies for future response and stimulus generalization on the part of the actor were measured. The 3 information variables and verb category each had a significant effect on causal attribution and on expectancy for behavioral generalization. (16 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)},
author = {McArthur, Leslie A.},
booktitle = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
doi = {10.1037/h0032602},
file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Jonathan/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/McArthur - 1972 - The how and what of why Some determinants and consequences of causal attribution.pdf:pdf},
isbn = {1939-1315$\backslash$r0022-3514},
issn = {0022-3514},
mendeley-groups = {Modality},
pages = {171--193},
title = {{The how and what of why: Some determinants and consequences of causal attribution.}},
volume = {22},
year = {1972}
}

@incollection{Kelley1967,
author = {Kelley, H. H.},
booktitle = {Nebraska Symposium On Motivation},
isbn = {0070-2099(Print)},
issn = {00702099},
publisher = {Springer Science},
mendeley-groups = {Modality},
pages = {192--238},
title = {{Attribution theory in social psychology}},
volume = {15},
year = {1967}
}


@article{Alicke2000,
abstract = {A culpable control model is advanced to describe the conditions that encourage as well as mitigate blame and to assess the process by which blame and mitigation occur. The fundamental assumptions of the model are that evidence concerning harmful events is scrutinized for its contribution to personal control and spontaneously evaluated for its favorableness or unfavorableness. Spontaneous evaluations encourage a blame-validation mode of processing in which evidence concerning the event is reviewed in a manner that favors ascribing blame to the person or persons who evoke the most negative affect or whose behavior confirms unfavorable expectations. The author delineates the elements of perceived control and then discusses spontaneous evaluation influences on control and blame assessments. The blame-validation process is described next. Finally, the culpable control model is compared with extant theories of blame and responsibility and its basic tenets summarized.},
author = {Alicke, M. D.},
doi = {10.1037/0033-2909.126.4.556},
file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Jonathan/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Alicke - 2000 - Culpable control and the psychology of blame.pdf:pdf},
isbn = {0033-2909},
issn = {0033-2909},
journal = {Psychological bulletin},
mendeley-groups = {Modality},
pages = {556--574},
pmid = {10900996},
title = {{Culpable control and the psychology of blame.}},
volume = {126},
year = {2000}
}

@article{Alicke2011,
author = {Alicke, M. D. and Rose, David and Bloom, Dori},
file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Jonathan/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Alicke, Rose, Bloom - 2011 - Causation, norm violation, and culpable control.pdf:pdf},
journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
mendeley-groups = {Modality},
number = {12},
pages = {670--696},
title = {{Causation, norm violation, and culpable control}},
volume = {108},
year = {2011}
}

@article{Sytsma2012,
abstract = {Recent work on the role of norms in the use of causal language by ordinary people has led to a consensus among several researchers: The consensus position is that causal attributions are sensitive to both statistical norms and prescriptive norms. But what is a statistical norm? We argue that there are at least two types that should be distinguished-agent-level statistical norms and population-level statistical norms. We then suggest an alternative account of ordinary causal attributions about agents (the responsibility view), noting that this view motivates divergent predictions about the effect of information about each of the two types of statistical norms noted. Further, these predictions run counter to those made by the consensus position. With this set-up in place, we present the results of a series of new experimental studies testing our predictions. The results are in line with the responsibility view, while indicating that the consensus position is seriously mistaken. ?? 2012 Elsevier Ltd.},
author = {Sytsma, Justin and Livengood, Jonathan and Rose, David},
doi = {10.1016/j.shpsc.2012.05.009},
isbn = {13698486 (ISSN)},
issn = {13698486},
journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C :Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences},
keywords = {Ordinary causal attributions,Prescriptive norms,Responsibility,Statistical norms},
number = {4},
pages = {814--820},
pmid = {22727128},
title = {{Two types of typicality: Rethinking the role of statistical typicality in ordinary causal attributions}},
volume = {43},
year = {2012}
}


@incollection{blanchard2013cause,
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	editor = {Helen Beebee and Christopher Hitchcock and Huw Price},
    title={Cause without default},
    author={Blanchard, Thomas and Schaffer, Jonathan},
	booktitle = {Making a Difference},
	year = {2017}
}

@article{Icard2017-ICANAA,
	year = {2017},
	volume = {161},
	pages = {80--93},
	author = {Thomas Icard and Jonathan Kominsky and Joshua Knobe},
	title = {Normality and Actual Causal Strength},
	journal = {Cognition}
}

@article{Lewis1973-LEWC,
	volume = {70},
	publisher = {Oxford Up},
	pages = {556--567},
	title = {Causation},
	journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
	author = {David Lewis},
	year = {1973},
	number = {17}
}
@article{Lombrozo2010-LOMCPH,
	title = {Causal-Explanatory Pluralism: How Intentions, Functions, and Mechanisms Influence Causal Ascriptions},
	pages = {303--332},
	volume = {61},
	year = {2010},
	journal = {Cognitive Psychology},
	number = {4},
	author = {Tania Lombrozo}
}

@book{Pearl2000-PEACMR,
	author = {Judea Pearl},
	year = {2000},
	publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
	title = {Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference}
}

@article{Schaffer2005-SCHCC,
	title = {Contrastive Causation},
	volume = {114},
	number = {3},
	journal = {Philosophical Review},
	publisher = {Duke University Press},
	pages = {327--358},
	year = {2005},
	author = {Jonathan Schaffer}
}

@article{Gilovich1995,
abstract = {This article reviews evidence indicating that there is a temporal pattern to the experience of regret. Actions, or errors of commission, generate more regret in the short term; but inactions, or errors of omission, produce more regret in the long run. The authors contend that this temporal pattern is multiply determined, and present a framework to organize the divergent causal mechanisms that are responsible for it. In particular, this article documents the importance of psychological processes that (a) decrease the pain of regrettable action over time, (b) bolster the pain of regrettable inaction over time, and (c) differentially affect the cognitive availability of these two types of regrets. Both the functional and cultural origins of how people think about regret are discussed.},
author = {Gilovich, T and Medvec, V H},
doi = {10.1037/0033-295X.102.2.379},
isbn = {0033-295X},
issn = {0033-295X},
journal = {Psychological review},
pages = {379--395},
pmid = {7740094},
title = {{The experience of regret: what, when, and why.}},
volume = {102},
year = {1995}
}

@article{Markman2006,
abstract = {The present study examined relationships among counterfactual thinking, per- ceived control, and depressive symptoms. Undergraduate participants, grouped according to nondepressed, mild–to–moderately depressed, and severely de- pressed symptom categories, described potentially repeatable negative academic events and then made upward counterfactuals about those events. Whereas partic- ipants endorsing mild–to–moderate depressive symptom levels generated more counterfactuals about controllable than uncontrollable aspects of the events they described, participants endorsing severe levels of depressive symptoms generated counterfactuals that were less controllable, less reasonable, and more characterological in nature. Furthermore, controllable (relative to uncontrollable) counterfactual thinking enhanced retrospective control perceptions for less de- pressed participants, but depleted control perceptions for more depressed partici- pants. Discussion focuses on the possibility that whereas controllable counterfactual thinking may be functional for nondepressed individuals, it may be less functional, if not dysfunctional, with increasingly depressed symptoms.},
author = {Markman, Keith D. and Miller, Audrey K.},
doi = {10.1521/jscp.2006.25.2.210},
file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Jonathan/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Markman, Miller - 2006 - Depression, control, and counterfactual thinking Functional for whom.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0736-7236},
journal = {Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology},
mendeley-groups = {Modality},
month = {feb},
number = {2},
pages = {210--227},
title = {{Depression, control, and counterfactual thinking: Functional for whom?}},
volume = {25},
year = {2006}
}

@article{Epstude2008,
abstract = {Counterfactuals are thoughts about alternatives to past events, that is, thoughts of what might have been. This article provides an updated account of the functional theory of counterfactual thinking, suggesting that such thoughts are best explained in terms of their role in behavior regulation and performance improvement. The article reviews a wide range of cognitive experiments indicating that counterfactual thoughts may influence behavior by either of two routes: a content-specific pathway (which involves specific informational effects on behavioral intentions, which then influence behavior) and a content-neutral pathway (which involves indirect effects via affect, mind-sets, or motivation). The functional theory is particularly useful in organizing recent findings regarding counterfactual thinking and mental health. The article concludes by considering the connections to other theoretical conceptions, especially recent advances in goal cognition.},
author = {Epstude, Kai and Roese, Neal J.},
doi = {10.1177/1088868308316091},
issn = {1088-8683},
journal = {Personality and Social Psychology Review},
keywords = {Adaptation,Affect,Cognition,Decision Making,Goals,Humans,Imagination,Intention,Judgment,Mental Health,Models,Motivation,Psychological,Self Concept,Self Efficacy,Thinking},
mendeley-groups = {Modality},
month = {may},
number = {2},
pages = {168--92},
pmid = {18453477},
title = {{Mental Simulation and Causal Attribution: When Simulating an Event Does Not Affect Fault Assignment}},
url = {http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=2408534{\&}tool=pmcentrez{\&}rendertype=abstract},
volume = {12},
year = {2008}
}

@article{Branscombe2003,
abstract = {Blame assignment and well-being among women who had been raped (N = 85) were investigated as a function of counterfactual thinking. The more upward counterfactuals (i.e., ways the rape might have been avoided) victims concurred with where some aspect of the self was mutated, the poorer their well-being. The effect of such upward counterfactual thinking on well-being was me- diated by increases in self-blame. The amount of blame assigned to both the rapist and society did not mediate the effect of counterfactual thinking on well-being. These observed effects of counter- factual thinking on blame assignment are consistent with those obtained with uninvolved observers and with victims of other types of trauma. Models testing other possible relationship orderings were not supported. Implications for intervention strategies with rape victims are considered. After},
author = {Branscombe, Nyla R and Wohl, Michael J A and Owen, Susan and Allison, Julie A and Ahogni, N},
doi = {10.1207/S15324834BASP2504},
file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Jonathan/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Branscombe et al. - 2003 - Counterfactual thinking, blame assignment, and well-being in rape victims.pdf:pdf},
journal = {Basic and Applied Social Psychology},
mendeley-groups = {Modality},
number = {4},
pages = {265--273},
title = {{Counterfactual thinking, blame assignment, and well-being in rape victims}},
volume = {25},
year = {2003}
}

@incollection{Kahneman1982,
annote = {Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1982) The
simulation heuristic. In Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Kahneman, D.,
ed.), pp. 201–208, Cambridge University Press},
author = {Kahneman, Daniel and Tversky, Amos},
booktitle = {Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases},
doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195376746.013.0038},
editor = {Kahneman, Daniel and Slovic, Paul and Tversky, Amos},
file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Jonathan/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Unknown - Unknown - The stimulation heuristic.pdf.pdf:pdf},
isbn = {0521284147},
issn = {01621459},
mendeley-groups = {Modality},
pages = {1124--1131},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
title = {{The simulation heuristic}},
volume = {185},
year = {1982}
}

@article{Roese1997,
abstract = {Counterfactuals are mental representations of alternatives to the past and produce consequences that are both beneficial and aversive to the individual. These apparently contradictory effects are integrated in a functionalist model of counterfactual thinking. The author reviews research in support of the assertions that (a) counterfactual thinking is activated automatically in response to negative affect, (b) the content of counterfactuals targets particularly likely causes of misfortune, (c) counterfactuals produce negative affective consequences through a contrast-effect mechanism and positive inferential consequences through a causal-inference mechanism, and (d) the net effect of counterfactual thinking is beneficial.},
author = {Roese, Neal J.},
doi = {10.1037//0033-2909.121.1.133},
file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Jonathan/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Roese - 1997 - Counterfactual thinking.pdf:pdf},
isbn = {0033-2909 (Print)$\backslash$r0033-2909 (Linking)},
issn = {0033-2909},
journal = {Psychological bulletin},
pages = {133--148},
pmid = {9000895},
title = {{Counterfactual thinking.}},
volume = {121},
year = {1997}
}

@article{Wells1987,
abstract = {Scenarios with dramatic outcomes often evoke counterfactual thinking, mentally undoing that outcome by mutating events in the causal scenario and thereby allowing for the mental simulation of new outcomes. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the order of four events in a scenario. Each of these events could be mutated to alter the outcome, and each event was described as having caused the event that followed it. People preferred to change the first event and showed no preference for changes to the subsequent events. We proposed that perceived mutability of an event is constrained by the existence of prior events that are believed to have caused the event. Experiment 2 examined characteristics of the events themselves, rather than their order, that affect their mutability. When these were framed as a norm, people were relatively unlikely to mutate the event in order to undo the outcome, instead preferring to mutate the exceptions. The norm or exception status of other events in the scenario did not affect the mutability of a focal event. Discussion includes the conditions that naturally trigger counterfactual thinking and the role of counterfactual thinking in affective reactions.},
author = {Wells, Gary L. and Taylor, Brian R. and Turtle, John W.},
doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.53.3.421},
file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Jonathan/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Wells, Taylor, Turtle - 1987 - The undoing of scenarios.pdf:pdf},
isbn = {1939-1315},
issn = {0022-3514},
journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
mendeley-groups = {Modality},
pages = {421--430},
title = {{The undoing of scenarios.}},
volume = {53},
year = {1987}
}

@article{McCloy2000,
abstract = {When people think about what might have been, they mentally undo controllable rather than uncontrollable events. We report the results of two experiments in which we examined this controllability effect in counterfactual thinking. The experiments show that the mutability of controllable events is influenced by the perceived appropriateness or inappropriateness of the events. The first experiment shows that people change inappropriate controllable actions more than appropriate controllable ones. The second experiment shows that people mutate inappropriate controllable events whether the outcome is exceptional or normal with respect to intrapersonal habitual norms, and whether the outcome is positive or negative. We discuss the implications for alternative theories of counterfactual thinking.},
author = {McCloy, Rachel and Byrne, Ruth},
doi = {10.3758/BF03209355},
file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Jonathan/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/McCloy, Byrne - 2000 - Counterfactual thinking about controllable events.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0090-502X},
journal = {Memory {\&} Cognition},
keywords = {Adult,Fantasy,Female,Humans,Internal-External Control,Male,Mental Recall,Problem Solving,Social Behavior,Thinking},
mendeley-groups = {Modality},
month = {sep},
number = {6},
pages = {1071--8},
pmid = {11105533},
title = {{Counterfactual thinking about controllable events}},
volume = {28},
year = {2000}
}

@misc{Davis1995,
abstract = {Thoughts concerned with how a negative outcome could have been avoided (counterfactuals [CFs]) that were generated by victims of traumatic events were examined to elucidate their significance for the coping process. In Study 1, 93 Ss were interviewed 4-7 yrs after the loss of a spouse or child in a motor vehicle accident. In Study 2, parents were interviewed at 3 wks (228 Ss) and 18 mo (124 Ss) following the death of a child from Sudden Infant Death Syndrome. Across both studies, (1) CFs were commonly reported; (2) the focus of CFs was typically on one's own (in)actions, rather than on the behavior of others; and (3) the more frequently Ss were undoing the event, the more distress they reported. This relation held after controlling for more general ruminations. Even in situations that lack the highly mutable circumstances described in scenario research, people coping with traumatic events appear unhindered in their ability to generate CFs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2003 APA, all rights reserved).},
author = {Davis, C. G. and Lehman, D. R. and Wortman, C. B. and Silver, R. C. and Thompson, S. C.},
booktitle = {Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin},
doi = {10.1177/0146167295212002},
file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Jonathan/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Davis et al. - 1995 - The undoing of traumatic life events.pdf:pdf},
isbn = {0146167295},
issn = {0146-1672},
mendeley-groups = {Modality},
pages = {109--124},
title = {{The undoing of traumatic life events}},
volume = {21},
year = {1995}
}


@misc{Girotto1991,
abstract = {Hypothesized that events corresponding to controllable actions (i.e., voluntary decisions) by the protagonist of a scenario are more mentally mutable than events which occur in the surrounding background. In Exp 1, with 108 undergraduates, the order and the controllability of 4 events in a scenario were manipulated. Contrary to the causal order effect hypothesis, Ss preferred to change the event corresponding to a voluntary decision of the scenario actor, regardless of its relative position in the scenario. Exp 2 showed that 90 undergraduate Ss made this choice regardless of the normal vs exceptional status of the voluntary action event. Exp 3, using 48 undergraduates, gave evidence that an unconstrained action performed by the focal actor of a story is more mutable than a constrained action performed by the same actor. Implications for the analysis of accidents involving human errors are discussed. ((c) 1997 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved):},
author = {Girotto, Vittorio and Legrenzi, Paolo and Rizzo, Antonio},
booktitle = {Acta Psychologica},
doi = {10.1016/0001-6918(91)90007-M},
file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Jonathan/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Girotto, Legrenzi, Rizzo - 1991 - Event controllability in counterfactual thinking.pdf:pdf},
issn = {00016918},
mendeley-groups = {Modality},
pages = {111--133},
title = {{Event controllability in counterfactual thinking}},
volume = {78},
year = {1991}
}

@misc{Hilton1990,
abstract = {Causal explanation takes place in and takes the form of conversation. Explanations are selected by questions and are thus governed by general rules of discourse. A conversational model of causal explanation is introduced that explicates social aspects of the explanation process by postulating that good explanations must be relevant to the focus of a why question, as well as being true. The notion of explanatory relevance enables an integration of the major models of the attribution process by showing that they use the same counterfactual logic but address different causal questions. The conversational perspective suggests a reinterpretation of many attributional biases, and also highlights the role of interpersonal goals in generating implicit questions, which in turn constrain explanations. Finally, the relevance of the conversational perspective for research on causal networks, the social context of explanation, and intrapsychic explanation is noted.},
author = {Hilton, Denis J.},
booktitle = {Psychological Bulletin},
doi = {10.1037/0033-2909.107.1.65},
file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Jonathan/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Hilton - 1990 - Conversational processes and causal explanation.pdf:pdf},
isbn = {00332909},
issn = {0033-2909},
mendeley-groups = {Modality},
pages = {65--81},
title = {{Conversational processes and causal explanation.}},
volume = {107},
year = {1990}
}

@book{Roese1994,
abstract = {Within a few short years, research on counterfactual thinking has mushroomed, establishing itself as one of the signature domains within social psychology. Counterfactuals are thoughts of what might have been, of possible past outcomes that could have taken place. Counterfactuals and their implications for perceptions of time and causality have long fascinated philosophers, but only recently have social psychologists made them the focus of empirical inquiry. Following the publication of Kahneman and Tversky's seminal 1982 paper, a burgeoning literature has implicated counterfactual thinking in such diverse judgments as causation, blame, prediction, and suspicion; in such emotional experiences as regret, elation, disappointment and sympathy; and also in achievement, coping, and intergroup bias. But how do such thoughts come about? What are the mechanisms underlying their operation? How do their consequences benefit, or harm, the individual? When is their generation spontaneous and when is it strategic? This volume explores these and other numerous issues by assembling contributions from the most active researchers in this rapidly expanding subfield of social psychology. Each chapter provides an in-depth exploration of a particular conceptual facet of counterfactual thinking, reviewing previous work, describing ongoing, cutting-edge research, and offering novel theoretical analysis and synthesis. As the first edited volume to bring together the many threads of research and theory on counterfactual thinking, this book promises to be a source of insight and inspiration for years to come.},
author = {Roese, Neal J. and Olson},
isbn = {1317780477},
mendeley-groups = {Modality},
publisher = {Psychology Press},
title = {{What might have been: The social psychology of counterfactual thinking}},
year = {1994}
}

@misc{Wells1989,
abstract = {We propose that people imagine alternatives to reality (counterfactuals) in assessing the casual role of a prior event. This process of mental simulation (D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, 1982) is used to derive novel predictions about the effects of default events on causal attribution. A default event is the alternative event that most readily comes to mind when a factual event is mentally mutated. The factual event is judged to be causal to the extent that its default undoes the outcome. In Experiment 1, a woman was described as having died from an allergic reaction to a meal ordered by her boss. When the boss was described as having considered another meal without the allergic ingredient, people were more likely to mutate his decision and his causal role in the death was judged to be greater than when the alternative meal was also said to have the allergic ingredient. In Experiment 2, a paraplegic couple was described as having died in an auto accident after having been denied a cab ride. People perceived the cabby's refusal to take the couple as a stronger cause of the deaths when his taking the couple would have undone the accident than when it would have not have. We conclude that an adequate theory of causal judgment requires an understanding of these counterfactual simulations.},
author = {Wells, Gary L. and Gavanski, Igor},
booktitle = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.56.2.161},
issn = {0022-3514},
mendeley-groups = {Modality},
pages = {161--169},
pmid = {18803737},
title = {{Mental simulation of causality.}},
volume = {56},
year = {1989}
}

@article{Icard2016-ICASPA,
	year = {2016},
	author = {Thomas Icard},
	journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
	pages = {863--903},
	title = {Subjective Probability as Sampling Propensity},
	volume = {7},
	number = {4}
}

@article{vul2014one,
  title={One and done? Optimal decisions from very few samples},
  author={Vul, Edward and Goodman, Noah and Griffiths, Thomas L and Tenenbaum, Joshua B},
  journal={Cognitive science},
  volume={38},
  number={4},
  pages={599--637},
  year={2014},
  publisher={Wiley Online Library}
}

@article{Cushman2013,
abstract = {Dual-system approaches to psychology explain the fundamental properties of human judgment, decision making, and behavior across diverse domains. Yet, the appropriate characterization of each system is a source of debate. For instance, a large body of research on moral psychology makes use of the contrast between "emotional" and "rational/cognitive" processes, yet even the chief proponents of this division recognize its shortcomings. Largely independently, research in the computational neurosciences has identified a broad division between two algorithms for learning and choice derived from formal models of reinforcement learning. One assigns value to actions intrinsically based on past experience, while another derives representations of value from an internally represented causal model of the world. This division between action- and outcome-based value representation provides an ideal framework for a dual-system theory in the moral domain.},
author = {Cushman, Fiery},
doi = {10.1177/1088868313495594},
file = {:C$\backslash$:/Users/Jonathan/AppData/Local/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Unknown - Unknown - full-text.pdf:pdf},
issn = {1532-7957},
journal = {Personality and social psychology review : an official journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc},
keywords = {Choice Behavior,Cognition,Emotions,Humans,Learning,Logic,Models, Psychological,Morals,Reinforcement (Psychology)},
month = {aug},
number = {3},
pages = {273--92},
pmid = {23861355},
title = {{Action, outcome, and value: a dual-system framework for morality.}},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23861355},
volume = {17},
year = {2013}
}
